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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to study the interplay between long term
productive investments and more short term and liquid speculative ones.
A three-period lived overlapping generations model allows us to make
this distinction. Agents have two investment decisions. When young,
they can invest in productive capital that provides a return during the
following two periods. When young or in the middle age, they can also
invest in a bubble. Assuming, in accordance with the empirical evidence,
that the bubbleless economy is dynamically efficient, the existence of a
stationary bubble raises productive investment and production. Indeed,
young agents sell short the bubble to increase productive investments,
whereas traders at middle age transfer wealth to the old age. We outline
that a technological change inducing either a larger return of capital in
the short term or a similar increase in the return of capital in both periods
raises productive capital, production and the bubble size. This framework
also allows us to discuss several economic applications: the effects of both
regulation on limited borrowing and fiscal policy on the occurrence of
bubbles, the introduction of a probability of market crash and the effect
of bubbles on income inequality.
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1 Introduction
In the recent years, there is a renew of interest in studying the link between
productive and purely speculative investments. Of course, this research agenda
has also been motivated by the last crisis. Some questions that naturally emerge
are of course whether speculative investments are good or rather bad for capital
accumulation and production, whether bubbles are compatible with dynamic
efficiency, and what is the role played by speculative assets. To address these
issues, the literature mainly focuses on the polar case where one may invest
either in productive capital or in an asset without fundamental value, which
is a pure bubble when its price is positive (Tirole 1985), Weil (1987), Bosi
and Seegmuller (2010), Fahri and Tirole (2012), Martin and Ventura (2012),
Hirano and Yanagawa (2013)).1 These two investments have returns and can
be traded at the same terms or periods. This also means that these assets have
the same liquidity. Despite the fact that following an idea already developed in
Woodford (1990), some of these contributions are concerned with the liquidity
role of bubbles, no difference is introduced between liquid and more illiquid
assets. Such a differential in the liquidity of assets is however underlined by
some empirical findings (Longstaff (2004), Amihud et al. (2005)).
In this paper, we take into account such a differential. We make a temporal
distinction between speculation and investments in productive assets. Specula-
tive investments give returns in the short run, whereas productive ones also give
returns in the longer term. Obviously, this distinction implies that the specu-
lative asset is more liquid than the productive one. As examples of productive
investments, we think about real estate, infrastructure, equipment and software,
education, research and development. The significance of long term productive
investments has recently been emphasized in some reports. Following Group of
Thirty (2013), long term investments represent 25-30% of GDP, even more in
some emerging countries, and will grow significantly by 2020.
Taking into account this difference between the two types of investments,
we show that the existence of a bubble is beneficial for production and is con-
sistent with dynamic efficiency. Indeed, the speculative asset will be sold short
by some traders to finance production. This can be an equilibrium because
other traders will buy the speculative asset to transfer their wealth in the next
period. This allows to have a bubble with a finite value in equilibrium. The
second main issue concerns the effect of technological change on the productive
investment and the bubble. We show that technological improvements raise cap-
ital investment, production and the bubble size, provided they do not increase
productivity in the longer term more than in the short term. This result is docu-
mented by several contributions (Caballero et al. (2006), Lansing (2008, 2012),
Scheinkman (2013)) explaining that episodes of bubbles are often associated to
new innovations.
In the literature on rational bubbles, first results have shown that investment
in a speculative bubble reduces capital accumulation in the long run to reach
1There are however some exceptions. See for instance Kamihigashi (2008).
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the golden rule (Tirole (1985)). This is the so-called crowding-out effect, which
requires that the steady state without bubble is dynamically inefficient2 and
implies that there is less production in the long run with a speculative bubble
than without. Dynamic inefficiency has been criticized by Abel et al. (1989)
for its lack of empirical relevance and, moreover, the lower level of production
when there is a bubble is not observed in data, as it is for instance illustrated by
Caballero et al. (2006) and Martin and Ventura (2012). More precisely, these
authors show that bubbles occur in periods of large GDP growth.
Recently, several papers have provided answers to these two criticisms. One
of the closest contribution to ours is surely Martin and Ventura (2012), based
on the existence of heterogeneous returns of capital investments and bubble
creation. Other close explanations are based on the existence of a financial
constraint generating an investment multiplier that boosts the wealth effect
associated to bubble holding (Fahri and Tirole (2012), Hirano and Yanagawa
(2013)). Some financial constraints also attribute to the bubble the role of
collateral (Kocherlakota (2009), Miao and Wang (2011)), meaning that it allows
to borrow larger amounts.3 We differ from the first paper because our analysis
does not need bubble shocks and from the last ones because our result does not
require any binding finance constraint. In fact, our mechanism is based neither
on some wealth effect, nor on a collateral role of bubble. Instead, we highlight
that traders investing in the productive investment sell short the speculative
asset to raise capital accumulation.
The model we examine is an overlapping generations model with three-period
lived households. When young, households can invest in two assets: capital,
which is used in production and give returns in the middle and old ages, and an
asset without fundamental value, which is traded also in the middle age. This
asset is a bubble when it is positively valued. In the middle age, agents can
invest only in the bubble to transfer purchasing power to the old age.4 It is
important to underline that this framework introduces the notion that capital
investment engages the investor and gives returns in a longer term than the
more liquid speculative investment.
When the speculative asset is not valued, i.e. there is no bubble, the econ-
omy converges, with oscillations, to a unique steady state which is dynamically
efficient if the saving rate of young agents is low enough. In all the paper, we
maintain this assumption since it seems to be the more credible one (Abel et
al. (1989)) and it is already well-known that bubbles may exist under dynamic
inefficiency (Samuelson (1958), Tirole (1985)).
Focusing now on equilibria where the speculative asset is positively valued,
there exists a steady state with a positive bubble that reaches the golden rule.
The significance of this result is twofold. First, the existence of a bubble is in
2As it is well-known, this idea was already emphasized in the model without capital accu-
mulation by Samuelson (1958).
3See Miao (2014) for a short survey of this recent literature.
4In the middle age, agents do not invest in the productive asset because, at the equilibrium
with bubble we focus on, they will prefer to reallocate income across generations using the
speculative bubble.
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accordance with a dynamically efficient bubbleless steady state. Second, the
bubble is productive as it allows to have larger levels of capital accumulation
and production than at the bubbleless steady state. This result is consistent
with empirical evidence showing that bubbles occur in periods of large GDP
growth. The underlying mechanism is based on the interaction between two
effects, a credit effect and a crowding-out effect. The first one corresponds to
the fact that young agents sell short the speculative asset to finance a raise of
productive capital investment. In the middle age, agents reimburse the amount
borrowed and also buy the speculative asset to transfer purchasing power to
the old age. This saving in middle age corresponds to the crowding-out effect,
which allows to reach the golden rule and also to give a positive value to the
bubble.
The bubble reallocates the income of middle age households to young and
old ones. This means that the demographic structure of overlapping generations
play a key role because first, some agents are able to be short sellers of the
bubble asset and second, there are heterogeneous investors in the market, young
and middle age agents.5 It is already known that heterogeneous investment
opportunities play a key role to generate bubbles enhancing production. In
overlapping generations economies, this has been emphasized by Martin and
Ventura (2012). In their model, the bubble reallocates resources towards more
productive agents. We contribute to this literature by showing that a productive
bubble also arises if it reallocates resources towards young agents, by generating
liquidities used to raise productive investment.
Since capital investment, which is a long term one that gives returns at
the following two periods, is a key element of our story, we study the effect of
different types of technological changes on the level of capital and bubble in the
long-run. We show that a biased technological shock implying a larger return
in the longer term may reduce capital. This happens because the bubble may
disappear. Indeed, in this case, the bubble can no more be used to finance
productive investment. On the contrary, if the technological shock is biased
toward short term return of capital or increases the returns of capital in the
short and long terms in like manner, we observe a raise of capital, production
and bubble size. This seems to be in accordance with episodes of bubbles that
are associated to new innovations, as it is documented and discussed in several
contributions (see for instance Caballero et al. (2006), Lansing (2008, 2012),
Scheinkman (2013)).
We further apply our framework to several economic concerns. We first
focus on the consequences of regulation on limited borrowing. To this end, we
introduce a credit constraint that prevents young agents from selling short more
than an amount collateralized by the capital investment. When the constraint
is binding, there exists again a bubbly steady state. The levels of production
and capital investment are larger than at the bubbleless steady state, but they
are lower than at the unconstrained bubbly steady state. Indeed, to ensure
5Note that in models with infinitely lived agents, short sale positions cannot sustain the
existence of a bubble. See Kocherlakota (1992) for more details.
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a binding finance constraint, the return of capital needs to be larger than in
the unconstrained case, which implies that capital is lower than the golden rule
level. This allows us to discuss the effect of financial regulation on the long-
run allocation. As a main insight with clear policy implications, we show that
deregulation is associated to larger levels of production and capital and a lower
price of the speculative bubble.
In a second extension, we contribute to the debate on the design of the fiscal
policy that aims to promote long term investments and GDP (Wehinger (2011)).
We show that the difference between capital and labor income taxes determines
both the existence and the nature of the bubble, productive or unproductive.
First, a reduction in the capital tax rate reduces the incentives to invest in the
speculative asset, which may rule out the bubble. If this occurs, this fiscal policy
reduces productive investment and production, as the bubble provided liquidity
to finance productive investment. Second, a reduction in the labor income tax
rate may decrease production. Indeed, such a fiscal policy reduces the liquidity
role of the bubble and, for a sufficiently large reduction in the labor income tax
rate, makes the bubble unproductive, meaning that it does no more enhance
capital and production.
Following Weil (1987), we introduce in a third extension a probability of
bubble crash. This stochastic environment introduces a risk premium between
the return of the risky bubble and the return of capital. In comparison to
the deterministic economy, this pushes up the level of capital at the stochastic
bubbly steady state. In particular, the riskier the bubble is, the larger the level
of capital. This also means that if the market crash occurs, the loss of capital
will be greater.
As a last application, we compare income inequalities at the bubbly and
bubbleless steady states. As we have seen, income reallocation across ages plays
a key role in our story of bubble enhancing production. This also means that the
bubble causes a reallocation of income across generations coexisting at the same
period: a young one, a middle age one and an old one. This is an important issue
because it allows us to study whether after a market crash, income inequalities
are raising. Comparing the distribution of incomes at the bubbly and bubbleless
steady states, we conclude that there are less income inequalities at the bubbly
steady state. This means that if a market crash occurs, the economy may
converge to an equilibrium characterized by more income inequalities. This
finding is in accordance with recent empirical studies, like OECD (2013), that
show an increase in income inequality after bubble crashes.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present our
framework. In Section 3, we study our benchmark economy without bubble. In
Section 4, we show the existence and provide a characterization of the steady
state with a bubble. In Section 5, we discuss the effect of technological change.
Section 6 is devoted to our four extensions on regulation on limited borrowing,
fiscal policy, stochastic bubbles, and income inequality. Section 7 concludes,
while many technical details are relegated to the Appendix.
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2 Model
Time is discrete (t = 0, 1, ...,+∞) and there are two types of agents, households
and firms.
2.1 Households
We consider an overlapping generations economy with constant population size.
Each generation is populated by a continuum of mass one of agents that live
for three periods. Each household has utility for consumption at each period
of time. Preferences of an individual born in period t are represented by the
following utility function:
u (c1,t) + βu (c2,t+1) + β
2u (c3,t+2) (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount rate and cj,t amounts for consumption
when young (j = 1), in the middle age (j = 2), and when old (j = 3). For
tractability, we assume that u(cj,t) = ln cj,t.
The household supplies one unit of labor when young. She shares her labor
income, given by the wage wt, between consumption c1,t and a portfolio of two
assets: productive capital kt+1 and a speculative asset b1,t. To capture the
idea that, in contrast to investing in the liquid speculative asset, productive
investment is less liquid and engages the household in the long term, we assume
that kt+1 provides a return φ1qt+1 in the second period of life and a return φ2qt+2
in the third period. Taking into account that the return on the speculative asset
is Rt+1 in the middle age, the household shares her income coming from the
returns of his portfolio choice between consumption c2,t+1 and a new investment
in the speculative asset b2,t+1. When old, the household’s consumption c3,t+1 is
equal to her income coming from the return of the productive investment done
in the young age and the investment in the speculative asset done in the middle
age and remunerated at the return Rt+2.
Accordingly, the budget constraints in each period of life of an agent born
in period t are:
c1,t + kt+1 + b1,t = wt (2)
c2,t+1 + b2,t+1 = φ1qt+1kt+1 +Rt+1b1,t (3)
c3,t+2 = φ2qt+2kt+1 +Rt+2b2,t+1 (4)
Since capital investment provides returns in the following two periods, this
introduces the difference between short term speculative investments and long
term productive investments, the first ones being more liquid than the second
ones, which is the key ingredient of our story. In order to clarify this, in Ap-
pendix B, we assume that capital fully depreciates after one period and the
household can invest in capital in the middle age too. We show that, in such a
model, there are no productive bubbles which foster production.
Note also that there is no productive investment in the middle age. This
assumption is, in fact, an equilibrium result from a steady state with bubbles.
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At this steady state a middle age household has no incentive to invest in long
term investment. She will prefer to reallocate her income across ages using
short term asset holdings, b1,t and b2,t+1, and invest in the two-period lived
productive asset when young. This is formally shown in Appendix C.
The speculative asset is supplied in one unit at a price pt at period t. New
investments in this asset by young and middle age agents are in quantities t
and 1 − t, respectively. Therefore, the values of this asset bought or sold by
these agents are b1,t = ptt and b2,t = pt(1 − t). Of course, if either b1,t < 0
or b2,t < 0, one type of trader is a short seller of this asset. It corresponds
to equilibria where either t < 0 or t > 1. Finally, since this asset has no
fundamental value, it is a bubble if pt = b1,t + b2,t > 0, whereas there is no
bubble if pt = b1,t + b2,t = 0 and b1,t = b2,t = 0. Taking into account the
definition of the variables b1,t and b2,t,
b1,t+1 + b2,t+1 = Rt+1 (b1,t + b2,t) , (5)
where the left-hand side of (5) measures the value of the bubble net purchasings
in period t+ 1 and the right-hand side the value of the net sales in that period.
It follows that the return Rt+1 is the growth factor of the bubble price.
2.2 Firms
Firms produce with the following technology:
Yt = K
α
t L
1−α, with α ∈ (0, 1/2)
where L is the number of workers and Kt is aggregate productive capital com-
posed by investment of generations born at period t− 1 and t− 2. Since house-
holds, that live three periods, invest in capital when young and this investment
has returns in the middle and old ages, the investment is two-period lived, and
completely depreciates after. We assume that the different investments are per-
fect substitutes in the production
Kt = φ1kt + φ2kt−1 (6)
where φ1 > 0 and φ2 > 0 measure the productivities of the investments of the
generations born in t− 1 and t− 2 respectively.6 In a sense, kt corresponds to
vintage capital of the One-Hoss Shay type with a lifetime of two periods, but
with different productivities during the lifetime (see Benhabib and Rustichini
(1991) and Boucekkine et al. (2005)).
Since L = 1, profit maximization under perfect competition implies that the
wage wt and the return qt from aggregate productive capital Kt are given by:
wt = (1− α)Kαt (7)
qt = αK
α−1
t (8)
6We do not allow to have φ2 = 0. Indeed, in this case, capital is no more a long term asset
and households have an incentive to invest in capital in middle age. This can be deduced from
Appendix C.
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3 Equilibrium without bubble
We first analyze the model without bubble, i.e. b1,t = b2,t = 0. It corresponds to
our benchmark case and it will be used in the following sections to compare the
properties of steady states with and without bubble. The household’s budget
constraints rewrite:
c1,t + kt+1 = wt (9)
c2,t+1 = φ1qt+1kt+1 (10)
c3,t+2 = φ2qt+2kt+1 (11)
Maximizing the utility (1) under the budget constraints (9)-(11), we get the
following arbitrage condition:
u′(c1,t) = qt+1φ1βu′(c2,t+1) + qt+2φ2β2u′(c3,t+2) (12)
Using u(cj,t) = ln cj,t, we deduce that the dynamics are given by:
kt+1 = Bwt = B(1− α)(φ1kt + φ2kt−1)α (13)
with B ≡ β(1 + β)/(1 + β + β2) ∈ (0, 1) being the savings rate when young.
At an interior steady state, we have w/k = q(φ1 + φ2)(1 − α)/α. Using
equation (13), we deduce that:
q =
α
B(1− α)(φ1 + φ2) ≡ q (14)
k = [B(1− α)] 11−α (φ1 + φ2) α1−α ≡ k (15)
Note that, at a steady state, the resource constraint on the good market
writes as c1 + c2 + c3 = [(φ1 +φ2)k]
α−k. Therefore, there is dynamic efficiency
if the net return of investment is positive, i.e. (φ1 + φ2)q > 1. Using equation
(14), this is satisfied under the following assumption:
Assumption 1 B < α/(1− α).
In the rest of the paper, we restrict our analysis to the configuration where
the steady state without bubble is dynamically efficient, which seems to be the
more realistic assumption (see Abel et al. (1989)).
To address the convergence to this steady state, we can rewrite equation
(13) as follows:
kt+1 = B(1− α)(φ1kt + φ2Xt)α (16)
Xt+1 = kt (17)
Using this dynamic system, we can construct the phase diagram of Figure 1
and analyze local dynamics to establish that the steady state is stable and the
equilibrium converges to this steady state with oscillations. All these results are
summarized in the following proposition, while details are given in Appendix
A.1:
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Figure 1: Dynamics without bubble
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, there is a unique steady state without
bubble (q, k) ∈ R2++, which is dynamically efficient. This steady state is stable
and the equilibrium converges to this steady state with dampened oscillations.
4 Equilibrium with a bubble
We study now the equilibrium with a positive bubble, i.e. b1,t + b2,t > 0.
Consumers maximize the utility subject to (2)-(4). Their optimal choices satisfy:
Rt+1 = qt+1φ1 +
qt+2φ2
Rt+2
(18)
Rt+1 =
u′ (c1,t)
βu′ (c2,t+1)
(19)
Rt+2 =
u′ (c2,t+1)
βu′ (c3,t+2)
(20)
The first equation is the no-arbitrage condition between the investment in
the bubble and in productive capital. The second and third equations define
the intertemporal choices in the first and second periods of life.
Bubbly steady state
From (5), a bubbly steady state is such that R = 1 and b1 + b2 > 0.
7 From
7When there is a bubble, we restrict our attention to the analysis of the steady state.
Dynamics are of a high order, strictly larger than three. Therefore, it is not possible to derive
analytical results as it has been done in the bubbleless case.
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(8) and (18), we obtain:
q = 1/ (φ1 + φ2) ≡ q (21)
k = α
1
1−α (φ1 + φ2)
α
1−α ≡ k (22)
Note that (21) implies that this bubble steady state attains the golden rule.
We then use (19) and (20) to obtain c2 = βc1 and c3 = β
2c1. We substitute
these two relationships and w/k = q (φ1 + φ2) (1− α)/α = (1− α)/α in (2)-(4)
to obtain:
b2 =
(
β2
1 + β + β2
− φ2
φ2 + φ1
α
1− α
)
w ≡ b2 (23)
b1 =
(
β (1 + β)
1 + β + β2
− α
1− α
)
w ≡ b1 (24)
b1 + b2 =
(
β + 2β2
1 + β + β2
− 2φ2 + φ1
φ2 + φ1
α
1− α
)
w (25)
where w is the equilibrium value of the wage. The following proposition estab-
lishes the existence of a bubbly steady state:
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1, there is a bubbly steady state (q, k) if the
following condition is satisfied:
β + 2β2
1 + β + β2
φ2 + φ1
2φ2 + φ1
>
α
1− α (26)
In addition, we have q < q and k > k.
This proposition establishes an important result: without any binding fi-
nance constraint, there exists a bubbly steady state characterized by a higher
level of production than at the efficient bubbleless steady state. The underlying
mechanism is therefore not based on an investment multiplier associated to a
credit constraint.
We note that inequality (26) is consistent with Assumption 1, if φ2 is suf-
ficiently low, in any case φ2 < βφ1. It follows that in the standard One-Hoss
Shay case where φ1 = φ2, inequality (26) cannot be satisfied under Assumption
1.8
We also observe that Assumption 1 implies that b1 < 0. Since b1 + b2 > 0,
it means that b2 > 0. On the one hand, b1 < 0 implies that the bubble allows
young agents to invest more in productive asset by having a short position on the
speculative asset. As a consequence, the bubble is beneficial for output, since
output is larger than in the bubbleless (efficient) steady state. This corresponds
to the credit effect of the bubble. This mechanism can also be understood noting
that without bubble, we have k = Bw at the steady state (see equation (13)).
Here, we rather have k + b1 = Bw. Strictly speaking, we have not a usual
8We further discuss the role of φ2 on the existence of a bubbly steady state in Section 5.
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leverage effect coming from a binding finance constraint (see for instance Fahri
and Tirole (2012)). But, being a short seller of the bubble, the young agent
increases investment in productive capital. In fact, using (21), we easily deduce
that k = wα/(1−α) > Bw under Assumption 1. Therefore, at a bubbly steady
state, the productive investment is larger than savings when young.
On the other hand, b2 > 0 implies that middle age households finance the
amount borrowed by the young and also generate the positive value of the
bubble. This induces a crowding-out effect that fosters the economy to reach
the golden rule, whose capital stock is k. This last effect, already identified in
the seminal paper by Tirole (1985), has a negative impact on production but
improves consumption since it allows to reach the golden rule. In fact, both the
credit and the crowding-out effects imply a reallocation from the middle age
to young and old ages, since at the middle age, the household reimburses the
amount borrowed when young and invests in the bubble to raise consumption
when old.
The demographic structure of overlapping generations play a key role be-
cause it introduces heterogeneous traders in the market, young and middle age
agents. This heterogeneity explains that the bubble increases production. As
young agents are short sellers of the speculative asset, they obtain liquidity
needed to raise productive investment.
It is worth mentioning that if Assumption 1 does not hold, we have b1 > 0.
Young agents do not borrow to raise the production. Since the bubbleless steady
state (q, k) is characterized by dynamic inefficiency in this case, we have q > q
and k < k. In other words, the existence of the bubble reduces productive
investment and production. The only role played by the bubble is to crowd-out
productive investment, as highlighted in Tirole (1985).
It is also relevant to note the importance of our long term investment. In-
deed, as we already mentioned, we develop in Appendix B the same model but
capital fully depreciates after one period and agents invest in capital in the mid-
dle age too. We show that, in this case, it is not possible to have a bubbly steady
state if the bubbleless one is dynamically efficient. In other words, the existence
of a bubbly steady state requires that the bubbleless one is characterized by
over-accumulation. As in Tirole (1985), the bubble reduces production in the
long run. Regarding the two effects we just highlight, this can be explained as
follows. The credit effect has a smaller impact if capital depreciates after one
period of use and the crowding-out effect is larger because, in the middle age,
the agent makes a portfolio choice between capital and bubble holding.
In this paper, we identify a new mechanism through which the bubble raises
production, which is in accordance with the empirical evidence. This also means
that if the bubble suddenly crashes, production will reduce, which is also in
accordance with what we observe.9 These different facts are well documented
by Caballero et al. (2006) and Martin and Ventura (2012), among others.
9Bubble crash is accurately studied in Section 6.3.
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5 Technological change
Since illiquid capital is a key ingredient of our results, we study in this section
the effects of technological changes on both the bubbly and bubbleless steady
states. These technological changes consist on modifying the productivities φ1
or φ2. In this way, we can study the effect of a technological change biased
toward either short term return (φ1 relative to φ2 increases) or a long term
return (φ2 relative to φ1 increases). Increasing φ1 and φ2 proportionally, we
also investigate the case of a technological change neutral with respect to the
short versus long term returns of capital. We use this analysis to highlight the
effect of technological change on long run capital accumulation in our model,
where the bubble provides liquidities to finance the productive investment.
Starting with the steady state without bubble, that exists and is efficient
for all parameter configurations in accordance with Assumption 1, the effect of
technological changes on the allocation is quite obvious. By direct inspection of
equations (14) and (15), we easily show the following result:
Proposition 3 (Bubbleless steady state) Under Assumption 1, productive in-
vestment k increases and the return q decreases if there is an increase of either
φ1, or φ2, or of both, φ1 and φ2, in the same proportion.
The explanation is quite simple. Without bubble, capital is given by savings
of young and, therefore, it depends on the level of the wage. A larger level of
φ1, or φ2, or φ1 and φ2 taking φ1/φ2 as constant pushes up the wage, which
raises productive investment and decreases q.
We now focus on the steady state with a positive bubble:
Proposition 4 (Bubbly steady state) Considering that Assumption 1 and in-
equality (26) are satisfied, we have the following:
1. Productive investment k increases, while the return q decreases if there
is an increase of either φ1, or φ2 or of both, φ1 and φ2, in the same
proportion;
2. b1 decreases if there is an increase of either φ1, or φ2 or of both, φ1 and
φ2, in the same proportion;
3. b2 and b1 + b2 increase if there is an increase of either φ1 or of both, φ1
and φ2, in the same proportion, but they decrease if there is an increase
of φ2.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
An increase of φ1 increases the incentive to invest in productive capital when
young. As a consequence, the wage increases, which reinforces the investment
in productive capital and, hence, the amount borrowed by the young house-
holds increases (lower b1). The middle age household has a larger income, even
relatively to what she expects to have when old. Hence, she transfers a larger
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amount to the old age, increasing her holding of the bubble b2. Despite the
more significant short position of the young on the speculative asset, the value
of the bubble, b1 + b2, increases.
Following a raise of φ2, the difference between the returns of the productive
asset and the bubble when old increases. Therefore, there is a substitution effect
that pushes up productive investment, but pushes down the purchasing of the
bubble b2 in the middle age. At a steady state, the wage increases following a
general equilibrium effect. This reinforces the raise of k, because young increase
their savings. Under Assumption 1, the cost of investment is lower than its
benefit, meaning that a young agent has an incentive to borrow more (lower b1)
to still increase her productive investment. Finally, the income effect associated
to the larger wage also has a positive impact on bubble purchasing b2, but is
dominated by the negative substitution effect. This implies that the value of
the bubble b1 + b2 decreases.
When there is a proportional increase of φ1 and φ2, i.e. keeping φ2/φ1
constant, the technological change is neutral. Of course, capital investment
raises because its return through the life-cycle is greater. Because of the general
equilibrium effect mentioned earlier, the wage and the capital incomes in the
middle and old ages increase. Therefore, there is no reallocation effect in the
portfolio choices, but more significant positions of bubble holdings, meaning a
lower b1 and a higher b2. The value of the bubble b1 + b2 increases, because it
linearly depends on income.
Note that aggregate production is given by qk (φ1 + φ2) /α = (q/α)
α
α−1 .
Since at each steady state, bubbly or bubbleless, q decreases following a raise
of either φ1, or φ2, or both proportionally, aggregate production evaluated at
these different steady states raises in each case.
In Proposition 4, we have enlightened how the bubbly steady state evolves
according to various technological changes. We have shown that whatever the
type of technological change considered, productive capital increases. However,
the results on the value of the bubble may be the opposite, depending if the
technological change is biased toward long term, or rather toward short term or
neutral. In addition, by direct inspection of Proposition 2, we see that the level
of the relative return of investment between the long and short terms φ2/φ1
affects the existence of the bubbly steady state and, therefore, its coexistence
with the bubbleless one. We study now more deeply what is the effect of the
different technological changes on the existence of the bubbly steady state.
We first note that inequality (26) is equivalent to φ2/φ1 < Φ, with:
Φ ≡
β+2β2
1+β+β2 − α1−α
2 α1−α − β+2β
2
1+β+β2
(27)
Using Assumption 1, we note that the denominator of (27) is strictly positive.
Hence, Φ is strictly positive if and only if:
Assumption 2 α/(1− α) < β+2β21+β+β2 .
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We can also show that under Assumption 1, Φ < β. We then deduce the
following proposition:
Proposition 5 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the bubbly steady state coexists
with the bubbleless steady state for all φ2/φ1 < Φ, the bubble collapses for
φ2/φ1 = Φ, and there is only the bubbleless steady state for φ2/φ1 > Φ. This
means that:
1. Any neutral technological change that increases both φ1 and φ2 proportion-
ally does not affect the existence of the bubbly steady state;
2. A technological change biased toward short term return that increases φ1
making φ1>φ2/Φ causes the existence of the bubbly steady state;
3. A technological change biased toward long term returns that increases φ2
making φ2<φ1Φ rules out the existence of the bubbly steady state.
There is a level of φ2/φ1 above which the bubbly steady state does no more
exist and the only steady state is the bubbleless one. In contrast, for φ2/φ1
low enough, there is a multiplicity of steady states, the bubbleless one coexists
with the bubbly one. Indeed, if φ2 is low regarding φ1, k is more a short term
investment because its return is larger in the first period than in the second
one. In this case, middle age agents transfer wealth to the future by using
the speculative asset. This explains the existence of the bubble, which allows
to have a steady state where productive investment benefits from the bubble
liquidities. On the contrary, if φ2 is large regarding φ1, k is more a long term
investment because its return is larger in the second period. In this case, middle
age agents do not use the bubble to transfer wealth to the future and there is
no bubble liquidities to raise productive investment. Since there is no bubble,
there will be dynamic paths that converge to the bubbleless steady state with
low accumulation of capital.10
Propositions 3-5 allow to have a general picture of long-run capital following
a technological change, biased toward short or long term returns, or which is
neutral. Figure 2 illustrates the different cases. Panel (b) shows that if agents
start by coordinating their expectations on the bubbly steady state and there
is a technological change that raises φ2, productive investment k increases if φ2
is low enough. Then, there is a level of φ2 above which the bubbly steady state
disappears and productive investment may converge to the stable bubbleless
steady state characterized by a lower level of k. When φ2 crosses the value
such that the bubbly steady state disappears, we may observe a decrease of
productive investment k even if the technological change increases its return
in the long term. This means that a larger return in the long term does not
10Indeed, even we are not able to address analytically the dynamic issues, we can see using
equation (5), that the dynamic path of the bubble is given by
∏+∞
i=t Ri ≡ Rt. In the long
run, we can exclude Rt > 1 because the bubble tends to +∞ and could no more be bought
by the households. Rt = 1 mainly corresponds to the bubbly steady state. When Rt < 1,
the bubble collapses in the long run, i.e. b1,t and b2,t tend to 0.
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necessarily imply higher levels of investment. In this paper, the bubble provides
liquidities to finance the productive investment, but a too significant return of
productive investment in the long-term rules out the bubble, and is therefore
damaging for productive investment itself.
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Figure 2: Effect of technological change
Panel (a) of Figure 2 illustrates the opposite configuration, which happens
if there is a technological change that raises φ1. There is a threshold level
above which the bubbly steady state exists. Then, if agents coordinate their
expectations on the bubbly steady state, any further raise of the return φ1
implies a raise of capital. In addition, Proposition 4 allows us to argue that the
bubble also enlarges under this type of technological change.
Finally, if φ2/φ1 < Φ, a positive technological change which is neutral has
a similar effect than the previous one. This is shown in Panel (c) of Figure
2. If agents coordinate their expectations on the bubbly steady state, such a
technological change induces a raise of capital and of the bubble size.
The last two results are especially interesting because they illustrate than
in our model, an innovation biased toward the short term or neutral between
the short and the long terms is associated to larger levels of capital, production
and bubble size. The evidence that episodes of bubbles are often associated to
new innovations has been documented and illustrated in several contributions
(see for instance Caballero et al. (2006), Lansing (2008, 2012) and Scheinkman
(2013)). This paper contributes to this literature by showing that this occurs if
the innovation does not mainly increase the productivity in the long term.
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6 Economic applications
In this section, we apply and extend our framework to several economic concerns.
First, we introduce in our framework a credit constraint that limits borrowing.
This allows us to discuss the effect of regulation on the financial markets on
the level of productive investment in the long-run. Second, we highlight the
role of the fiscal policy on the existence of bubbles. Third, we extend our
framework to consider a positive probability of bubble crash. We are therefore
able to discuss the interplay between the riskiness of the speculative asset and
productive investment. Finally, we further compare the properties of the bubbly
and bubbleless steady states analyzing income inequalities evaluated at each
steady state.
6.1 Regulation on limited borrowing
We extend our basic framework to introduce a credit constraint that limits the
amount borrowed using short positions on the speculative asset. This allows
us to study the implications of credit constraints on productive investment and
also the effect of regulation of the financial sphere on the level of capital.
As argued by Scheinkman (2013), borrowers are often forced to cover their
short positions and loans are often collateralized. Accordingly, since young
agents are those who have an incentive to borrow, we limit their possibilities to
borrow introducing the following credit constraint:
Rt+1b1,t ≥ −θqt+1φ1kt+1, with θ ∈ [0, 1) (28)
This constraint, which is extensively used in the literature (Hirano and Yana-
gawa (2013), Le Van and Pham (2015)), stipulates that if one household borrows
when young having a short position on bubble holdings, the reimbursement of
this debt in the middle age is limited by the return of the productive invest-
ment at that period. If this constraint is binding, productive investment acts
as a collateral. The parameter θ measures the borrowing limit. If θ = 0, credit
is not possible. As θ increases, the credit constraint relaxes as the borrowing
limit increases.
Note first that equation (28) also implies that the income in the middle
age is strictly positive. Second, we do not introduce such a constraint on the
investment decision in the middle age, because the equilibria we consider are
always characterized by b2,t+1 > 0, meaning that the introduction of such a
constraint is irrelevant.
In the following, we call a constrained equilibrium / steady state, an equi-
librium / steady state where the credit constraint (28) is binding.
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6.1.1 Constrained equilibrium
In the constrained equilibrium, the optimal choice of consumers satisfies:11
Rt+1b1,t + θqt+1φ1kt+1 = 0 (29)
Rt+2 =
u′ (c2,t+1)
βu′ (c3,t+2)
(30)
βu′ (c2,t+1)
(
(1− θ) qt+1φ1 + qt+2φ2
Rt+2
)
=
(
1− θqt+1φ1
Rt+1
)
u′ (c1,t) (31)
The first equation is the binding credit constraint, the second and third
equations correspond to the intertemporal choices in the first and second periods
of life.
For further reference, we rewrite equations (29)-(31). First, using (2), (3)
and (29), we rewrite (31) as:
β
[
wt −
(
1− θ qt+1φ1
Rt+1
)
kt+1
](
(1− θ) qt+1φ1 + qt+2φ2
Rt+2
)
=
(
1− θqt+1φ1
Rt+1
)
[(1− θ) qt+1φ1kt+1 − b2,t+1] (32)
Finally, we use (3), (4) and (29) to rewrite (30) as
βRt+2 [(1− θ) qt+1φ1kt+1 − b2,t+1] = qt+2φ2kt+1 +Rt+2b2,t+1 (33)
6.1.2 Constrained bubbly steady state
From equation (5), a bubbly steady state is obtained when b1 + b2 > 0 and
R = 1. From (29) and (33), we obtain:
b2 =
[β (1− θ)φ1 − φ2] qk
(1 + β)
(34)
b1 = −θφ1qk < 0 (35)
b1 + b2 =
(
[β − θ (1 + 2β)]φ1 − φ2
1 + β
)
qk (36)
Combining (32) and (34), we deduce that
k =
Bw∗
1− θq∗φ1 ≡ k
∗ (37)
and, using (7) and (8), we obtain:
q =
1
B
(
1−α
α
)
(φ1 + φ2) + θφ1
≡ q∗ (38)
where w∗ is the equilibrium value of the wage. Of course, substituting k∗ and
q∗ into (34) and (35), we get the equilibrium values b∗1 and b
∗
2.
11The consumers’ problem is precisely solved in Appendix A.3.
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Proposition 6 Assuming that the credit constraint is binding and Assumption
1 holds, there is a constrained bubbly steady state (q∗, k∗) if the following two
conditions are satisfied:
φ2/φ1 < β and θ <
βφ1 − φ2
(1 + 2β)φ1
≡ θ̂ (39)
In addition, we have q∗ 6 q and k∗ > k.
When the credit constraint is binding, a bubble exists if (i) φ1 is large in
comparison to φ2, which means that households are not able to transfer to
much wealth to the old age without the bubble; (ii) θ is low, implying that the
credit constraint restricts the possibility of credit when young. In particular, in
the standard One-Hoss Shay case where φ1 = φ2, inequalities (39) cannot be
satisfied and there is no bubbly steady state with a binding constraint.
As in the unconstrained case,12 the important finding is that production is
larger at a steady state with bubble than in the steady state without bubble.
Hence, the bubble is beneficial for the level of output, in accordance with the
empirical evidence. This result is again due to the coexistence of a credit effect
and a crowding-out effect. However, in contrast to the unconstrained case,
there is now a leverage effect that pushes up productive investment. Indeed,
by direct inspection of equation (37), we see that productive investment raises
with income and savings when young Bw∗. However, there is also an investment
multiplier 1/(1−θq∗φ1) which is a measure of leverage. The larger is the return
from capital, the more a young agent can invest being a short seller of the
bubble.
6.1.3 Co-existence of steady states and effect of deregulation
On the one hand, there always exists a steady state without bubble (Proposition
1). On the other hand, Proposition 6 shows that there exists a bubbly steady
state when the credit constraint is binding, whereas the unconstrained bubbly
steady state may, of course, exist if the constraint is not binding (Proposition 2).
The question that arises is then to know which type of bubbly steady state will
coexist with the bubbleless one. We now investigate more deeply this question,
relating it to the value of the parameter θ, which can also be seen as a measure
of financial deregulation.
As shown in Appendix A.3, the credit constraint is binding along the dy-
namic path if c2,t+1 > Rt+1βc1,t. At a steady state, this means that:
(1− θ)φ1qk − b2 > βR
(
w − k + θqφ1k
R
)
At a constrained bubbly steady state, we have R = 1, b2 = b
∗
2 and q = q
∗.
Hence, the constrained bubbly steady state exists if:
θ <
[
1−B
(
1− α
α
)]
(φ1 + φ2)
φ1
≡ θ∗. (40)
12In this section, we call the unconstrained bubbly steady state, the steady state obtained
in Proposition 2.
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We note that θ∗ < θ̂ if and only if inequality (26) is satisfied.13 This means
that for θ > θ∗, Proposition 2 applies, the credit constraint is not binding when
the bubble is stationary, and the unconstrained bubbly steady state may exist.
We then deduce the following proposition:
Proposition 7 Under Assumption 1, there always exists a unique steady state
(q, k) without bubble.
1. If inequality (26) holds, it coexists with the constrained bubbly steady state
(q∗, k∗) for θ < θ∗ and with the unconstrained bubbly steady state (q, k)
for θ > θ∗.
2. If inequality (26) does not hold, it coexists with the constrained bubbly
steady state (q∗, k∗) for θ < θ̂. If θ > θ̂, there is no bubbly steady state.
This proposition establishes that a constrained bubbly steady state exists if
θ is sufficiently low. Indeed, if θ is large enough, the credit constraint is not so
stringent. Young agents are allowed to borrow significant amounts. Either the
credit constraint is not binding and the bubbly steady state is the unconstrained
one (case 1), or the supply of speculative asset from young −b1 is too important
to have an equilibrium with b1 + b2 > 0 (case 2).
Strictly speaking, the parameter θ can be seen as a policy parameter that
regulates the credit market.14 The larger θ is, the more important is the dereg-
ulation of the financial sector, since a young trader can raise her short position
on the asset market in accordance with the credit constraint. On the contrary,
if θ is quite small, there is more regulation of the financial sphere, because
borrowing and short positions are more limited.
An interesting insight is that when inequality (26) holds, i.e. case 1 of Propo-
sition 7 applies, deregulation cannot prevent the existence of bubbles. However,
both the nature of the bubble and the amount of productive investment change.
We study now more deeply these effects of θ. The results are summarized in
the following proposition:
Proposition 8 Under Assumption 1 and inequality (26), the following holds
for all θ ∈ [0, θ∗).
1. When θ increases, k∗ increases, while q∗, b∗1 and b
∗
1 + b
∗
2 decreases.
2. If θ = 0, k∗ = k, q∗ = q, b∗1 = 0, and b
∗
2 > 0.
3. limθ→θ∗ k∗ = k, limθ→θ∗ q∗ = q, limθ→θ∗ b∗1 = b1 and limθ→θ∗ b
∗
2 = b2.
13Note that if Assumption 1 is not satisfied, i.e. the steady state without bubble is dynam-
ically inefficient, θ∗ is negative. This means that a constrained bubbly steady state cannot
exist.
14Note that Hirano and Yanagawa (2013) interpret this parameter as the degree of market
imperfection, the larger θ is, the lower the imperfection.
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Proof. See Appendix A.4.
This proposition shows that when θ increases from 0 to θ∗, k∗ continuously
increases from k to k (see also Figure 3) and q∗ continuously decreases from
q to q. This means that when the deregulation is more important (θ larger),
the production raises. The mechanism goes of course through the credit effect,
which is reinforced when θ becomes larger. In particular, when θ = 0, young
agents cannot borrow by selling the speculative asset. There is no credit effect.
Therefore, the production is exactly the same than at a bubbleless steady state.
When θ tends to its upper bound θ∗, the credit effect is the largest one at a
constrained steady state and the production tends to the level obtained in the
unconstrained case.
This result can be connected to some findings of Fahri and Tirole (2012),
who rather interpret θ as the degree of pledgeability. In contrast to them, a
bubble may exist if the degree of pledgeability is high enough, because it may
exist when the credit constraint is no more binding. Our result also differs from
Hirano and Yanagawa (2013) where an intermediate degree of pledgeability is
required for the existence of a bubble.
-
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Figure 3: Effect of deregulation
As a corollary, this means that the difference between k∗ and k raises with
θ. It follows that, even if it is not formally introduced, a crash of the bubble
that fosters the economy to converge to a bubbleless steady state with k = k is
more costly for an economy more deregulated, because the economy experiences
a larger decrease of capital and production.15
A relevant insight that follows from this analysis is that under more dereg-
ulation, the short position becomes larger (b1 more negative), explaining the
more significant credit effect, but the value of the bubble asset b1 + b2 reduces.
The intuition is as follows. Deregulation, by raising the borrowing facilities,
increases the net supply of speculative asset, which causes the reduction in the
price of this asset. Hence, more deregulation implies a lower level of speculative
bubble. It follows that if inequality (26) holds, then regulation of the financial
15Indeed, when the bubble crashes (b1,t = b2,t = 0), the economy behaves as in Section 3.
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system cannot prevent the existence of bubbles and, by constraining the supply
of speculative assets, it increases the size of the bubble and reduces production.
6.2 Fiscal policy
There is a debate on the design of the fiscal policy that aims to promote long
term investments (Wehinger (2011)). The purpose of this section is to contribute
to this debate by studying the effects of taxes on both the existence of bubbles
and on the stationary values of capital and GDP. To this end, we consider a
government that collects taxes on labor income, τw < 1, and on capital income,
τk < 1.
16 We do not introduce a tax on the return of the speculative asset.
Its net return is zero at a bubbly steady state and, thus, such a tax would be
irrelevant in the long run.
We assume that government revenues are employed to finance non-productive
government spending Gt. In this way, government spending does not distort in-
dividuals decisions. At each period, the government budget is balanced:
Gt = τwwt + τkqt(φ1kt + φ2kt−1)
Note that if either τw < 0 or τk < 0, there is a subsidy on either labor or capital.
Such a policy scheme is in accordance with the government budget constraint,
as long as Gt > 0.
The introduction of this fiscal policy modifies the individual budget con-
straints as follows:
c1,t + kt+1 + b1,t = (1− τw)wt (41)
c2,t+1 + b2,t+1 = (1− τk) qt+1φ1kt+1 +Rt+1b1,t (42)
c3,t+2 = (1− τk) qt+2φ2kt+1 +Rt+2b2,t+1 (43)
We study now how taxes modify the long run equilibrium with and without
bubble. We examine in particular which type of fiscal policy promotes capital
accumulation.
6.2.1 Bubbleless steady state with taxation
Without bubble (b1,t = b2,t = 0), solving the consumer’s problem when the
budget constraints are (41), (42) and (43), it can be easily shown that capital
accumulation is only modified by the labor income tax as follows:
kt+1 = (1− τw)Bwt = (1− τw)B(1− α)(φ1kt + φ2kt−1)α
From the firm’s problem, we obtain that, at a steady state, w/k = q(φ1+φ2)(1−
α)/α. We easily deduce that:
q =
α
(1− τw)B(1− α)(φ1 + φ2) ≡ q
T
k = [(1− τw)B(1− α)] 11−α (φ1 + φ2) α1−α ≡ kT
16We do not introduce lower bounds on the tax rates to allow to subsidize either capital or
labor income.
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Since capital accumulation comes from savings when young, labor income
and labor taxation play a key role in determining the stationary level of capi-
tal. In contrast, because we have log-linear preferences, the capital return, and
therefore the tax rate on capital, do not affect the steady state. Of course, if
savings would depend on the return on capital, but would be not too sensitive,
the key role of labor taxation regarding the tax rate on capital would still hold.
6.2.2 Bubbly steady state with taxation
Maximizing the utility (1) under the budget constraints (41)-(43), we show
that, at the bubbly equilibrium (b1,t + b2,t > 0), the consumer’s optimal choices
satisfy:
Rt+1 = (1− τk)
(
qt+1φ1 +
qt+2φ2
Rt+2
)
Rt+1 =
u′ (c1,t)
βu′ (c2,t+1)
Rt+2 =
u′ (c2,t+1)
βu′ (c3,t+2)
At the bubbly steady state, R = 1. Then, the previous equations simplify to
c2 = βc1, c3 = β
2c1 and
q =
1
(1− τk) (φ1 + φ2) ≡ q
T
Using (7) and (8), we obtain that:
k = [(1− τk)α]
1
1−α (φ1 + φ2)
α
1−α ≡ kT
w = (1− α) [α (1− τk) (φ1 + φ2)]
α
1−α ≡ wT
and using (41)-(43),
b2 =
(
β2
1 + β + β2
− ∆φ2
φ2 + φ1
α
1− α
)
(1− τw)wT ≡ bT2
b1 =
(
B − α∆
1− α
)
(1− τw)wT ≡ bT1
b
T
1 + b
T
2 =
(
β + 2β2
1 + β + β2
− α∆
1− α
φ1 + 2φ2
φ1 + φ2
)
(1− τw)wT
where ∆ ≡ 1−τk1−τw , measures the asymmetric effect of taxes on the two sources
of income. When ∆ = 1, the two tax rates are identical. In this case, they do
not affect the existence of the bubble, as follows from the expression of b
T
1 + b
T
2 .
Thus, the existence of a bubble does not depend on the level of the two tax rates,
but on the difference between them. More precisely, a bubble (b
T
1 + b
T
2 > 0)
exists if:
∆ <
(
β + 2β2
1 + β + β2
)(
φ1 + φ2
φ1 + 2φ2
)(
1− α
α
)
≡ ∆
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The parameter ∆ also determines if the bubble is capital enhancing or pro-
ductive. More precisely, qT < qT and k
T
> kT if and only if ∆ > ∆, where
∆ ≡ ( 1−αα )B. In this case, the bubble is productive and is characterized by
b
T
1 < 0. Therefore, the productive role of the bubble is determined by the rela-
tive significance of the capital tax rate τk and the labor one τw. The reason is
quite immediate. As we have seen above, capital at the bubbleless steady state
is mainly determined by the wage income, and therefore, decreases with the
labor tax rate. In contrast, the level of capital at the bubbly steady comes from
an arbitrage condition between the speculative asset and capital. This explains
that capital at the bubbly steady state is only affected by the capital tax rate,
through a decreasing relationship. We understand from these two observations
that the bubble is capital enhancing if ∆ is large enough, i.e. the capital tax
rate is low enough and/or the labor tax rate is sufficiently large.
Since ∆ < ∆ if and only if φ2/φ1 < β, we deduce that:
Proposition 9 Under Assumption 1, the following holds:
1. For φ2/φ1 < β, (i) if ∆ ≤ ∆, there is a stationary non-productive bubble
with k
T ≤ kT and bT1 ≥ 0; (ii) if ∆ ∈
(
∆,∆
)
, there is a stationary
productive bubble with k
T
> kT and b
T
1 < 0; and (iii) if ∆ ≥ ∆ there is
no bubbly steady state.
2. For φ2/φ1 > β, (i) if ∆ < ∆, there is a stationary non-productive bubble
with k
T
< kT and b
T
1 > 0; and (ii) if ∆ ≥ ∆, there is no bubbly steady
state.
This proposition shows that the fiscal policy parameter ∆ determines the
effect of fiscal policy on both the existence of bubbles and its nature, productive
or unproductive. As explained above, if this parameter is sufficiently small (τk
large with respect to τw), the bubble is non-productive. In this case, the young
agents have a long position on the speculative asset (b
T
1 ≥ 0). Since a large tax
on capital income makes the investment in productive capital less attractive,
the bubble is used to transfer wealth to the future, implying that the bubble
is not productive. The same rationality explains that if ∆ is sufficiently large,
then there is no bubble in the economy. In this case, the tax on capital income is
low in comparison to the taxes on labor income. With respect to capital, there
is less incentive to invest in the speculative asset because the fiscal policy is in
favor of the return on capital and the after-tax income when young is quite low.
Finally, for intermediate values of ∆, a productive bubble may arise because
the after-tax return on capital is not too large to rule out bubble holding in
the middle age and the after-tax wage is large enough to sustain a large enough
productive investment when young and the purchase of the bubble in the middle
age.17 In this case, the bubble is used by the young to finance productive capital
and by the middle age to transfer wealth to the future.
17We further note that the condition φ2/φ1 < β required to get a productive bubble was
already highlighted in Section 5.
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We can now advocate which type of fiscal policy is the most adequate to
promote high levels of capital and GDP. Let us focus on the most interesting
case where φ2/φ1 < β (Proposition 9.1) and a productive bubble may exist. As
we have already discussed, k
T
is decreasing in τk and k
T is decreasing in τw,
meaning that k
T
/kT is increasing in ∆ while a positive bubble exists. This is
precisely what is described in Proposition 9.1. Let us assume that agents coordi-
nate their expectations on the bubbly steady state. If ∆ is sufficiently low (lower
than ∆), this steady state has an unproductive bubble (k
T
< kT ), because the
too large tax on capital depresses productive investment and/or a too significant
after-tax wage engages agents to use the bubble to transfer purchasing power
in the middle and old ages. When ∆ raises, the difference between the levels of
capital at the bubbly and bubbleless steady states goes up, becoming positive
for ∆ > ∆. However, when ∆ attains and becomes higher than ∆, the bubbly
steady state disappears and the economy may converge to the bulbleless one
with lower levels of capital and GDP. From the previous analysis, we obtain two
interesting insights on the fiscal policy design. First, decreasing capital taxa-
tion is not always an appropriate policy to boost productive investment. If the
policy is already accommodating, it may rule out the bubble and eliminate a
mean to finance productive investment. Second, reducing the labor income tax
may not be growth enhancing when there is already a bubble. In this case, this
policy may change the nature of the bubble making it unproductive.
6.3 Stochastic bubbles
In the previous sections, when the economy is at a bubbly steady state, there is
a permanent bubble. This is clearly not consistent with the recurrent evidence
that shows that bubbles eventually crash. In this section, we aim to understand
whether a probability of market crash will affect the existence and the level of
capital at the bubbly steady state. To this end, we extend our framework to
the case where the bubble is stochastic. When there is a bubble, agents may
coordinate their expectations on an equilibrium without bubble because of a
sunspot process which associates a positive probability to a market crash. In
such an economy, we study the existence of a stochastic bubbly steady state,
i.e. a steady state with positive bubble that takes into account that the bubble
may crash with a positive probability. Of course, such a steady state will coexist
with the bubbleless one examined in Section 3.
Following Weil (1987), we consider a Markov process of a bubble crash.
If there is no bubble at period t, there is no bubble at period t + 1 with a
probability 1. If there is a bubble at period t, there is a probability pi ∈ (0, 1]
such that the bubble persists at the next period and a probability 1 − pi such
that the bubble crashes at period t + 1. Note that a market crash in period
t+ 1 means that the price pt+1 of the asset without fundamental value is zero,
i.e. b1,t+1 = b2,t+1 = Rt+1 = 0 using our notations.
Let us examine the household’s behavior in such a stochastic environment.
To fix ideas, we focus on an household born at period t and we assume that
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there is a bubble at this date.18 In the following, we denote c+2,t+1 (c
0
2,t+1) the
consumption in middle age when the bubble persists (crashes) in t + 1. If the
bubble crashes in t+ 1, the consumption when old is c003,t+2. If the bubble does
not crash in t + 1, the consumption when old is c++3,t+2 if it does not crash in
t+ 2 too, while it is c+03,t+2 if it crashes in t+ 2 (see also Figure 4).
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Figure 4: Consumption profile when the bubble has a probability to crash 1−pi
Using (2)-(4), we deduce that the different household’s consumptions are
given by:
c1,t = wt − kt+1 − b1,t, (44)
c+2,t+1 = qt+1φ1kt+1 +Rt+1b1,t − b2,t+1, c02,t+1 = qt+1φ1kt+1, (45)
c++3,t+2 = qt+2φ2kt+1 +Rt+2b2,t+1, c
+0
3,t+2 = qt+2φ2kt+1 = c
00
3,t+2 (46)
where c+03,t+2 = c
00
3,t+2 because capital investment is done when young only. The
household determines her choices maximizing her expected utility Et[u (c1,t) +
βu (c2,t+1) + β
2u (c3,t+2)], that rewrites:
u(c1,t) +β
[
piu(c+2,t+1) + (1− pi)u(c02,t+1)
]
+β2
[
pi2u(c++3,t+2) + (1− pi2)u(c003,t+2)
]
(47)
because c+03,t+2 = c
00
3,t+2, c
+0
3,t+2 occurs with probability pi(1− pi) and c003,t+2 with
probability 1− pi. Maximizing (47) under the constraints (44)-(46), we obtain:
c+2,t+1 = βpiRt+1c1,t (48)
c++3,t+2 = βpiRt+2c
+
2,t+1 (49)
1 =
φ1qt+1
Rt+1
+
φ2qt+2
Rt+2Rt+1
+ β(1− pi)[1 + β(1 + pi)] c1t
kt+1
(50)
At a stochastic bubbly steady state, we have by definition R = 1. Substitut-
ing (44)-(46) into (48)-(50) and using w/k = q (φ1 + φ2) (1 − α)/α, we deduce
18If there is no bubble at this period, one get the bubbleless economy.
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after some computations that:
q =
R+
φ1 + φ2
≡ q+, (51)
k =
α
1
1−α (φ1 + φ2)
α
1−α
(R+) 11−α
≡ k+, (52)
with R+ ≡ 1
1 + 1−αα
β(1−pi)(1+β(1+pi))
1+β+β2
6 1 (53)
In addition, the bubble size is given by:
b1 =
(
βpi(1 + βpi)
1 + β + β2
− α
1− α
)
w+ ≡ b+1 (54)
b2 =
(
β2pi2
1 + β + β2
− φ2
φ1 + φ2
α
1− α
)
w+ ≡ b+2 (55)
b+1 + b
+
2 =
(
βpi(1 + 2βpi)
1 + β + β2
− α
1− α
φ1 + 2φ2
φ1 + φ2
)
w+ (56)
where w+ is the wage evaluated at the stochastic bubbly steady state. Using
these expressions, we deduce the following proposition:
Proposition 10 Under Assumption 1, there is a stochastic bubbly steady state
(q+, k+) if the following condition is satisfied:
βpi(1 + 2βpi)
1 + β + β2
>
α
1− α
φ1 + 2φ2
φ1 + φ2
(57)
In addition, we have q+ 6 q and k+ > k.
To understand this proposition, it is relevant to compare it with Proposition
2, which establishes the existence of a bubbly steady state in the deterministic
economy. By direct inspection of inequalities (26) and (57), we immediately
see that the condition for the existence of a stochastic bubble (57) requires the
existence of a deterministic bubble (26). In fact, the left-hand side of inequality
(57) is increasing in pi and is equal to 0 when pi is equal to 0. This means that
a stationary stochastic bubble exists only if the probability of a bubble crash
1 − pi is not too close to 1, which is of course in accordance with the seminal
paper by Weil (1987).
Proposition 10 also establishes that the return q is smaller in the stochastic
case. Therefore, the level of capital is larger at the stochastic bubbly steady
state than at the deterministic one. This can be explained as follows. When
the probability of crash is zero (pi = 1), the global return of capital investment
(φ1 + φ2)q is equal to the return of the bubble R = 1. In contrast, when the
probability of crash is strictly positive (pi < 1), the bubble asset becomes risky.
Therefore, there is a risk premium between the returns of bubble and capital,
which is measured by the inverse of R+. In fact, the global return of capital
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(φ1 + φ2)q is smaller than 1 and equal to R
+. One can easily show that the
lower pi is, the more risky the bubble asset and the smaller R+. The effect of
pi on the stochastic bubbly steady state is accurately investigated in the next
proposition:
Proposition 11 Consider that Assumption 1 and inequality (57) hold. At the
stochastic bubbly steady state, an increase of pi implies the following:
1. Productive investment k+ decreases, while the return q+ increases;
2. Both b+1 and b
+
2 increase, implying that b
+
1 + b
+
2 also increases.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Taking into account that there is a stochastic bubbly steady state, i.e. in-
equality (57) holds, this proposition proves what happens when the bubble asset
is more risky, i.e. pi becomes lower. The risk premium of the bubble is raising,
which implies a larger level of capital at the stochastic bubbly steady state, be-
cause of the decreasing marginal productivity. Young households finance capital
by a more significant short position on the speculative asset (lower b+1 ). Because
it becomes more risky, risk averse middle age agents buy a weaker amount of
the bubble (lower b+2 ).
We can also deduce from this proposition that there is a level of the prob-
ability of market crash 1 − pi above which any stochastic bubble does no more
exist. Another interesting implication is that the level of capital increases with
the probability of market crash 1 − pi. As long as inequality (57) is satisfied,
the riskier the bubble asset, the larger the difference between the capital levels
before and after the crash (k+ − k). The presence of a riskier speculative asset
is beneficial for capital accumulation, but generates a larger cost, in terms of
capital loss, when the market crash occurs.
6.4 Income inequalities
At each steady state (bubbly or bubbleless), households have the same utility
over the life-cycle. There is however a sort of heterogeneity among households
because of the demographic structure of overlapping generations. Taking into
account that the population size of each generation is constant and normalized
to 1, three agents coexist at each period of time: a young with an income I1 ≡ w,
a middle age one born one period before with an income I2 ≡ φ1qk +Rb1, and
an old one born two periods before with an income I3 ≡ φ2qk+Rb2. This means
that, because of the demographic structure, there is an income profile associated
to each steady state, with an associated degree of inequality between age groups.
Obviously, aggregate measures of inequality depend on both between age groups
inequality and on within age groups inequality. The former type of inequality
is directly related to the ability of agents to transfer wealth across periods
and, therefore, it will be affected by the existence of bubbles. The aim of the
following analysis is to compare the income profiles evaluated at the bubbleless
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and bubbly steady states. The underlying question is of course to know whether
a speculative bubble is associated to more or less income inequalities and, as a
corollary, whether an income distribution is more or less unequal after a market
crash.
To address this issue, we begin by computing the income profile (I1, I2, I3)
evaluated at the bubbleless steady state. Using the results obtained in Section
3, we get:
I1 = w, I2 =
φ1
φ1 + φ2
α
1− αw, I3 =
φ2
φ1 + φ2
α
1− αw (58)
Using equations (21), (23) and (24), and w/k = (1−α)/α, we determine the
income profile (I1, I2, I3) evaluated at the bubbly steady state:
I1 = w, I2 =
(
B − α
1− α
φ2
φ1 + φ2
)
w, I3 =
β2
1 + β + β2
w (59)
Using these two income profiles, we first show the following:
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1 and inequality (26), we have I1 < I1, I2 > I2
and I3 < I3. Moreover, noting Ia ≡ (I1 + I2 + I3)/3 and Ia ≡ (I1 + I2 + I3)/3
the average incomes at the bubbly and bubbleless steady states respectively, we
further get Ia < Ia.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
This lemma confirms what we highlight in previous sections. The existence
of the bubble has a redistribution effect of income among the different periods of
life, i.e. young, middle age and old. This also means that there is a reallocation
of income across the different generations living at the same period. When there
is a bubble, the generation living at the middle age reimburses her borrowing,
reducing her income with respect to the bubbleless case. The generation which
lives in the young age has a larger income in the bubbly steady state because
the larger level of capital increases the wage. The generation living in the
old age has also more income in the bubbly steady state because of the larger
level of production and the positive level of the bubble that allows to transfer
purchasing power in the last period of life. Finally, the average income is larger
at the bubbly steady state because of the redistributive effect across generations
allowed by the bubble and the larger wage.
Despite these preliminary results, we need to discuss now more deeply the
issue of income inequality. We first define the index of inequalities we choose
to work with. We consider the coefficient of variation, which is one of the
index that has good properties, as weak principle of transfers, income scale
independence, principle of population and decomposability (see Cowell (1995)).
Let the variance V of income be defined by V = (I21 + I
2
2 + I
2
3 )/3 − I2a . The
coefficient of variation is defined by CV =
√
V /Ia. Evaluating it at the bubbly
steady state and the bubbleless one, we compare the income inequality at both
steady states:
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Proposition 12 Let α ≡ β+β21+2β+2β2 . Under Assumption 1 and inequality (26),
according to the level of the coefficient of variation, there is a lower income
inequality at the bubbly steady state than at the bubbleless one if φ2 is low enough
and α larger but sufficiently close to α.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
The lower level of income inequality at the bubbly steady state is clearly
explained by the redistributive effect of the bubble across generations. This
result means that the bubbly steady state that coexists with the bubbleless one
is more desirable according to several criteria. It is not only characterized by a
larger level of capital, but also lower inequalities.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper analyzes the interplay between liquid speculative bubbles with re-
turns in the short term and less liquid productive investments with returns in a
longer term. We introduce this temporal distinction using an overlapping gen-
erations model with three-period lived agents. Agents make a portfolio choice
between one investment in capital that gives returns during two periods and a
bubble traded at each period of time. Considering that the bubbleless economy
is dynamically efficient, the bubble enhances production because young traders,
who invest in productive capital, are short sellers of the speculative asset, while
middle age traders buy the bubble.
Our framework also allows us to discuss the effect of technological change.
Productivity shocks either biased toward the short term return or neutral with
respect to the relative productivities of capital in the short and longer terms
push up capital investment, production and the bubble size. As it is documented
in the literature, this illustrates the idea that innovations are often associated to
the raise of both production and bubbles. However, we show that this does not
happen if the technological shock mainly increases the productivity of capital
in the long run.
Our framework allows us to discuss many economic applications. Introducing
a credit constraint, we discuss the effect of financial regulation on the levels of
capital and bubble. Introducing fiscal policy, we also argue that a low fiscal
pressure on capital income relative to labor income can be bad for productive
investments. When the bubble becomes stochastic, we show that the riskier
the bubble is, the larger the level of capital, but the larger the loss in the case
of a market crash. Finally, our model also allows us to conclude that income
inequality among generations is lower in the presence of a speculative bubble.
29
A Appendix A
A.1 Stability of the steady state without bubble
To construct the phase diagram, we consider the dynamic system (16)-(17).
We use equation (17) to determine the regions where Xt is growing. Indeed,
Xt+1 > Xt is equivalent to kt > Xt. Using equation (16), we can determine the
regions where kt is growing. Indeed, kt+1 > kt is equivalent to:
Xt >
1
φ2
[(
kt
B(1− α)
) 1
α
− φ1kt
]
Using these different ingredients, we can easily deduce Figure 1. To address
the stability properties of the steady state, we can also differentiate the dy-
namic system (16)-(17) around the steady state with k > 0. We easily get the
characteristic polynomial P (λ) = λ2 − Tλ+D = 0, with:
T = α
φ1
φ1 + φ2
> 0
D = −α φ2
φ1 + φ2
< 0
This implies that P (−1) > 0, P (0) < 0 and P (1) > 0. Therefore, one
eigenvalue λ1 belongs to (0, 1) and the other one λ2 to (−1, 0), which proves
local convergence with oscillations.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Since we have q = 1/(φ1 +φ2) and k = α
1
1−α (φ1 +φ2)
α
1−α , we obviously deduce
that ∂q/∂φ1 < 0, ∂k/∂φ1 > 0, ∂q/∂φ2 < 0, ∂k/∂φ2 > 0 and, taking φ2/φ1
constant, ∂q/∂(φ1 + φ2) < 0, ∂k/∂(φ1 + φ2) > 0.
We now focus on the bubble size and speculative asset holdings. The wage is
given by w = (1− α)α α1−α (φ1 + φ2) α1−α . Therefore, using (24) and Assumption
1, we easily deduce that ∂b1/∂φ1 < 0 ∂b1/∂φ2 < 0 and, taking φ2/φ1 constant,
∂b1/∂(φ1 + φ2) < 0.
Note that φ2/(φ2 + φ1) is decreasing in φ2 and does not vary when φ2/φ1
stays constant. By direct inspection of (23), we get ∂b2/∂φ1 > 0 and, taking
φ2/φ1 constant, ∂b2/∂(φ1 +φ2) > 0. Substituting the expression of the wage in
(23), we also get:
∂b2
∂φ2
= α
1
1−α (φ1 + φ2)
2α−1
1−α
(
φ2
φ1 + φ2
1− 2α
1− α −
1 + β
1 + β + β2
)
This is strictly negative if and only if (1−α)(1+β) > [(1− 2α)β2 − α(1 + β)]φ2/φ1.
This last inequality is satisfied for all φ2/φ1 > 0 if its right-hand side is negative.
It requires:
α
1− α >
β2
1 + β + β2
30
Since this is always satisfied under Assumption 1, we have ∂b2/∂φ2 < 0.
Using all these results, we obviously have ∂(b1 + b2)/∂φ2 < 0. Let us note
that (2φ2 + φ1)/(φ2 + φ1) decreases with respect to φ1 and does not vary when
φ2/φ1 stays constant. Using (25), we deduce that ∂(b1 + b2)/∂φ1 > 0 and,
taking φ2/φ1 constant, ∂(b1 + b2)/∂(φ1 + φ2) > 0.
A.3 Consumers’ problem when there is a credit constraint
Consumers maximize the utility subject to (2)-(4) and (28). Consider the fol-
lowing Lagrangian function:
£ = u (c1,t) + βu (c2,t+1) + β
2u (c3,t+2) + λ1,t (wt − c1,t − kt+1 − b1,t) +
λ2,t (qt+1φ1kt+1 +Rt+1b1,t − c2,t+1 − b2,t+1) + λ3,t(qt+2φ2kt+1
+Rt+2b2,t+1 − c3,t+2) + λ4,t (Rt+1b1,t + θqt+1φ1kt+1) .
The first order conditions with respect to c1,t, c2,t+1, c3,t+2, kt+1, b1,t, b2,t+1
are, respectively,
λ1,t = u
′ (c1,t) , λ2,t = βu′ (c2,t+1) , λ3,t = β2u′ (c3,t+2) (60)
−λ1,t + λ2,tqt+1φ1 + λ3,tqt+2φ2 + λ4,tθqt+1φ1 = 0 (61)
−λ1,t + λ2,tRt+1 + λ4,tRt+1 = 0 (62)
−λ2,t + λ3,tRt+2 = 0 (63)
From (60) and (62), we obtain that λ4,t = u
′ (c1,t) /Rt+1− βu′ (c2,t+1). The
credit constraint is binding if u′ (c1,t) > Rt+1βu′ (c2,t+1) , which implies that
c2,t+1 > Rt+1βc1,t. In this case, λ4,t > 0 and we obtain (29) in the main text.
Combining (60)-(63), we obtain (30) and (31) in the main text.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 8
Using (38), we easily get ∂q∗/∂θ < 0. Since k = (q/α)
1
α−1 (1/(φ1 + φ2)), we
have ∂k∗/∂θ > 0. Moreover,
b1 = −θqφ1k = −θq αα−1φ1 α
1
1−α
φ1 + φ2
which implies that
∂b∗1
∂θ < 0. Using now (36), we have:
b∗1 + b
∗
2 =
(
[β − θ (1 + 2β)]φ1 − φ2
1 + β
)
α
1
1−α
φ1 + φ2
(q∗)
α
α−1
After some computations, we obtain:
∂(b∗1 + b
∗
2)
∂θ
= (b∗1 + b
∗
2)φ1q
∗
[
α
1− α − (1 + 2β)
B 1−αα (φ1 + φ2) + θφ1
(β − θ(1 + 2β))φ1 − φ2
]
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Using (39), we deduce that:
B 1−αα (φ1 + φ2)
βφ1 − φ2 (1 + 2β) >
B(1 + 2β)
β
1− α
α
>
1− α
α
> 1 >
α
1− α,
where the last two inequalities follow because we assume α < 0.5. This implies
that ∂(b∗1 + b
∗
2)/∂θ < 0.
The other assessments of the proposition are established substituting θ = 0
and θ = θ∗ in equations (34), (35), (37) and (38).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 11
Using (53), we derive:
∂R+
∂pi
=
1− α
α
β(1 + 2βpi)
1 + β + β2
(R+)2 > 0
Using (51) and (52), we easily deduce that q+ is increasing in pi and k+ is
decreasing in pi. Using now (7), (8) and (51), the wage w+ rewrites:
w+ = (1− α)α α1−α (φ1 + φ2) α1−α (R+)− α1−α
Using this expression and (54), we can show that:
∂b+1
∂pi
=
β(1 + 2βpi)
1 + β + β2
w+
[
1−
(
βpi(1 + βpi)
1 + β + β2
− α
1− α
)
R+
]
This is strictly positive because R+ 6 1 and βpi(1+βpi)1+β+β2 < 1. In a similar way,
using (55), we derive:
∂b+2
∂pi
= w+
[
2β2pi
1 + β + β2
−
(
β2pi2
1 + β + β2
− φ2
φ1 + φ2
α
1− α
)
R+ β(1 + 2βpi)
1 + β + β2
]
Since β(1+2βpi)1+β+β2 < 1, R+ 6 1 and 2β
2pi
1+β+β2 >
β2pi2
1+β+β2 , we deduce that b
+
2 is
increasing in pi.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 1
Using (58) and (59), we have I1/I1 = w/w > 1, because k > k. We also have:
I3
I3
=
β2
1+β+β2w
φ2
φ1+φ2
α
1−αw
>
w
w
> 1
where the first inequality comes from Assumption 1 and inequality (26), which
also ensure b2 > 0. We further compute:
I2
I2
=
(
B − α1−α φ2φ1+φ2
)
w
φ1
φ1+φ2
α
1−αw
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Since w = k/B = (1 − α) 11−α (φ1 + φ2) α1−αB α1−α and w = k(1 − α)/α =
(1− α)α α1−α (φ1 + φ2) α1−α , we obtain:
I2
I2
=
[(
1 +
φ2
φ1
)
B − α
1− α
φ2
φ1
](
α
1− α
) 2α−1
1−α
B
α
α−1
Under Assumption 1, we note that I2/I2 decreases with respect to φ2 and,
when φ2 = 0, we have I2/I2 = (I2,0/I2,0), where:
I2,0
I2,0
≡
(
α
(1− α)B
) 2α−1
1−α
< 1
under Assumption 1 and α < 1/2. We deduce that I2/I2 < 1 for all φ2 > 0.
Finally, we compute the average incomes evaluated at the bubbleless and bubbly
steady states. Using (58) and (59), we get:
Ia =
1
3
w
1− α (64)
Ia =
w
3
[
1 +
β + 2β2
1 + β + β2
− α
1− α
φ2
φ1 + φ2
]
(65)
One can easily show that the term into brackets in the last equation is larger
than 1/(1−α) because inequality (26) is satisfied. Since w > w, we deduce that
Ia > Ia.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 12
Let V and V be the variance of income evaluated at the bubbleless and bubbly
steady states, respectively. Using (58), (59), (64) and (65), we get:
V =
w2
3
vφ2 and V =
w2
3
vφ2 (66)
with:
vφ2 = 1 +
(
α
1− α
)2
φ21 + φ
2
2
(φ1 + φ2)2
− 1
3(1− α)2
vφ2 = 1 +
β4
(1 + β + β2)2
+
(
B − α
1− α
φ2
φ1 + φ2
)2
−1
3
(
1 + 2β + 3β2
1 + β + β2
− α
1− α
φ2
φ1 + φ2
)2
We start by considering the case φ2 = 0 where vφ2 = v0 and vφ2 = v0 are
given by:
v0 = 1 +
(
α
1− α
)2
− 1
3(1− α)2 (67)
v0 = 1 +
β4
(1 + β + β2)2
+B2 − 1
3
(
1 + 2β + 3β2
1 + β + β2
)2
(68)
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According to Assumptions 1 and inequality (26) under φ2 = 0, α belongs to
the interval (α, α), with:
α ≡ β + β
2
1 + 2β + 2β2
and α ≡ β + 2β
2
1 + 2β + 3β2
where α < 1/2. When α tends to α,
v0 − v0 = −
β2(2 + 4β + 2β2)
3(1 + β + β2)2
< 0
This means that v0 − v0 < 0 for α larger but sufficiently close to α. Using
(64), (65), (66) and the proof of Lemma 1, we deduce that, for φ2 = 0 and
α larger but sufficiently close to α, V /I
2
a < V /I
2
a. We conclude that, for φ2
sufficiently low and α larger but sufficiently close to α, CV < CV , where CV and
CV denote the coefficient of variation evaluated at the bubbly and bubbleless
steady states, respectively.
B Appendix B
It is shown in this paper that if the bubbleless steady state is dynamically
efficient, there exists a bubbly steady state with a larger level of capital. One
could ask whether this could not happen in an economy without our assumption
of vintage capital that has returns during two periods. In the following, we
consider the same model, but we assume that capital completely depreciates
after one period of use and that the household can invest in capital not only
when young, but also in the middle age.19 To keep things as short as possible,
we mainly underline the differences with respect to the model considered in the
main text.
B.1 Bubbleless steady state with capital length of one pe-
riod and efficiency
We first consider the economy without bubble. The household invests kt+1
in productive capital when young and k˜t+2 in the middle age. The aggregate
capital used for the production at period t is Kt = kt + k˜t and the budget
constraints write20:
c1,t + kt+1 = wt
c2,t+1 + k˜t+2 = qt+1kt+1
c3,t+2 = qt+2k˜t+2
19In contrast to our framework, it is optimal for the household to also invest in productive
capital in the middle age.
20We note that aggregate capital does no more involve some heterogenous productivity
parameters φ1 and φ2. Indeed, we would like that the bubble can be traded in the youth and
the middle age. This means that the return of the bubble should be equal to the return of
capital in middle age and when old. This requires that φ1 = φ2. To simplify the notations,
we further consider that φ1 = φ2 = 1.
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Maximizing the utility function (1) under these three budget constraints, we
obtain:
c2,t+1 = βqt+1c1,t and c3,t+2 = βqt+2c2,t+1 (69)
Substituting these expressions into the budget constraints, we get:
kt+1 = Bwt and k˜t+1 =
β
1 + β
qtkt (70)
Using wt = (1 − α)(kt + k˜t)α and qt = α(kt + k˜t)α−1, we get the dynamic
system:
kt+1 = B(1− α)(kt + k˜t)α
k˜t+1 =
β
1 + β
α(kt + k˜t)
α−1kt
Therefore, a steady state is a solution (k, k˜) satisfying:
k = B(1− α)(k + k˜)α and k˜ = β
1 + β
α[B(1− α)] 1−αα k 2α−1α
Using these two last equations, we obtain:
[B(1− α)] 1α
[
k
α−1
α +
β
1 + β
α(B(1− α)) 1−αα k 2α−2α
]
= 1
Since the left-hand side is decreasing in k from +∞ to 0 when k increases
from 0 to +∞, there is a unique solution k to this equation. We deduce that
there is a unique steady state. Analyzing local dynamics in the neighborhood
of this steady state, it is possible to show that it is stable, with one eigenvalue
that belongs to (0, 1) and the other one to (−1, 0).
It is more important for our aim to examine under which condition this
steady state is dynamically efficient. Using the same methodology than in Sec-
tion 3, we see that the resource constraint on the good market writes now
c1 + c2 + c3 = (k+ k˜)
α − (k+ k˜). We deduce that there is dynamic efficiency if
q = α(k + k˜)α−1 > 1. Because of the Cobb-Douglas technology, we have:
q
(
1 +
k˜
k
)
=
α
1− α
w
k
Using (70), this equation is equivalent to:
q
(
1 +
β
1 + β
q
)
=
α
(1− α)B
Therefore, there is a unique solution q > 0 given by:
q =
1 + β
2β
[√
1 + 4
α
1− α
1 + β + β2
(1 + β)2
− 1
]
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We deduce that q > 1 and the steady state is dynamically efficient if and
only if the following inequality is satisfied:
α
1− α >
β(1 + 2β)
1 + β + β2
(71)
B.2 Bubbly steady state with capital length of one period
We consider the economy with a bubble. This means that the household faces
the following budget constraints:
c1,t + kt+1 + b1,t = wt
c2,t+1 + k˜t+2 + b2,t+1 = qt+1kt+1 +Rt+1b1,t
c3,t+2 = qt+2k˜t+2 +Rt+2b2,t+1
Maximizing the utility (1) under these three budget constraints, we get the
first order conditions (69) and Rt+i = qt+i for i = 1, 2. Using them and the
budget constraints, we get:
kt+1 + b1,t =
β + β2
1 + β + β2
wt
k˜t+2 + b2,t+1 =
β
1 + β
qt+1(kt+1 + b1,t) =
β2
1 + β + β2
qt+1wt
At a bubbly steady state, R = q = 1 and:
k + b1 =
β + β2
1 + β + β2
w, k˜ + b2 =
β2
1 + β + β2
w
Taking the sum of these two expressions and using w = (k + k˜)(1 − α)/α,
we get:
b1 + b2
k + k˜
=
β + 2β2
1 + β + β2
1− α
α
− 1
When there is dynamic efficiency at the bubbleless steady state, we note,
using (71), that the right-hand side of this equality is negative. Therefore, there
is no steady state with a positive bubble, which is in contrast to our framework
where there are returns on capital investment during two periods.
This also means that bubbles may exit when the bubbleless steady state is
inefficient. Therefore, bubbles that foster production do not exist when invest-
ment in capital is not a long run project and there is the possibility of reinvesting
in capital in the middle age. As explained in Section 4, the reallocation effect
that we highlight is dampened because the credit effect is lower and bubbles are
aimed to transfer more wealth to the older generation.
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C Appendix C
We extend our model to a framework where middle age households may also
invest in capital with two-period length. This extension allows us to show
whether it is not optimal to invest in capital in the middle age at a bubbly
steady state. Let k˜t+2 the amount of capital investment in the middle age and
φ3 its productivity. The budget constraints rewrite:
c1,t + kt+1 + b1,t = wt (72)
c2,t+1 + k˜t+2 + b2,t+1 = φ1qt+1kt+1 +Rt+1b1,t (73)
c3,t+2 = φ2qt+2kt+1 + φ3qt+2k˜t+2 +Rt+2b2,t+1 (74)
The household maximizes the utility (1) under the budget constraints (72)-
(74) and k˜t+2 > 0. Defining the Lagrangian function:
£ = u (c1,t) + βu (c2,t+1) + β
2u (c3,t+2) + λ1,t (wt − c1,t − kt+1 − b1,t) +
λ2,t
(
φ1qt+1kt+1 +Rt+1b1,t − c2,t+1 − b2,t+1 − k˜t+2
)
+ λ3,t(φ2qt+2kt+1
+φ3qt+2k˜t+2 +Rt+2b2,t+1 − c3,t+2) + λ4,tk˜t+2
we get:
λ1,t = u
′ (c1,t) , λ2,t = βu′ (c2,t+1) , λ3,t = β2u′ (c3,t+2) (75)
λ1,t = λ2,tφ1qt+1 + λ3,tφ2qt+2 (76)
λ2,t = λ3,tφ3qt+2 + λ4,t (77)
λ1,t = λ2,tRt+1, λ2,t = λ3,tRt+2 (78)
where λ4,t > 0(= 0) if and only if k˜t+2 = 0(> 0). Using (78), the arbitrage
conditions (76) and (77) rewrite:
φ1qt+1
Rt+1
+
φ2qt+2
Rt+1Rt+2
= 1 (79)
φ3qt+2
Rt+2
6 1 (80)
where the last condition holds with a strict inequality if k˜t+2 = 0. At a bubbly
steady state, we have Rt+1 = Rt+2 = 1 and qt+1 = qt+2 = q. Therefore, (79)
and (80) become:
(φ1 + φ2)q = 1 and φ3q 6 1 (81)
where the last condition holds with a strict inequality if k˜ = 0. We immediately
deduce that k˜ > 0 if and only if φ3 = φ1+φ2 and k˜ = 0 if and only if φ3 < φ1+φ2.
Let us assume that at the first period after investment, the productivity of
k˜ is φ1 and, at the second period, φ2 as for the investment k done when young.
Then, two configurations may happen depending if the old household can sell or
not to another trader capital k˜, which still gives returns at the following period.
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If k˜ cannot be sold by the old household and bought by another agent, its
return is φ1q. This means that φ3 = φ1 and k˜ = 0.
Assume now that there is a stock market where k˜ can be sold at a price pk.
The return perceived by the old household who holds k˜ is equal to φ1q + pk.
Therefore, k˜ > 0 if and only if pk = φ2q. Indeed, in such a case, we have
φ3 = φ1 + φ2. However, no agent (young or middle age) has an incentive to
buy this asset at this price pk. Indeed, such an agent would pay an amount
pkk˜ = φ2qk˜, whereas its discounted gain holding this asset during one period
would be φ2qk˜, because R = 1 at a bubbly steady state. This means that k˜ = 0
in this configuration too.
Therefore we can conclude that at a bubbly steady state, we always have
k˜ = 0.
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